阻碍绿色能源: 印度太阳能市场的交易对手风险
Holding up Green Energy: Counterparty Risk in the Indian Solar Power Market
Econometrica · 2026 · [{"name": "Nicholas Ryan", "affiliation": ["Yale University"]}]
中文摘要
本文研究套牢风险如何影响采购。我使用印度全部太阳能发电拍卖的数据。印度情境使得能够对交易对手风险进行清晰估计, 因为由同一企业在同一邦建设的太阳能电站, 其采购拍卖或由有风险的邦政府自身中介, 或由受信任的中央政府中介。我发现, 一个平均水平邦的交易对手风险使太阳能价格提高 10%。由于绿色能源需求富有弹性, 这一风险溢价大幅减少了投资。由中央政府进行合同中介消除了交易对手风险溢价。
Abstract
This paper studies how the risk of hold‐up affects procurement. I use data on the universe of solar power auctions in India. The Indian context allows clean estimates of counterparty risk, because solar plants set up in the same states, by the same firms, are procured in auctions intermediated by either risky states themselves or the trusted central government. I find that the counterparty risk of an average state increases solar prices by 10%. This risk premium sharply reduces investment, because demand for green energy is elastic. Contract intermediation by the central government eliminates the counterparty risk premium.