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多评价者绩效评估与激励

Multirater Performance Evaluations and Incentives
Journal of Labor Economics · 2025 · Axel Ockenfels、Dirk Sliwka、Peter Werner

中文摘要

我们通过分析一个形式化模型并开展一项实验室实验,比较了单个主管与主管群体对员工绩效作出的评估。模型预测,如果主管群体理性地整合其获得的有关员工绩效的信号,多评价者评估就会比单一评价者评估更精确。我们的受控实验室实验证实了这一预测,并发现证据表明,这确实可归因于群体内部准确的信息处理。此外,当员工薪酬取决于评估结果时,多评价者评估往往与更高的绩效相关联。

Abstract

We compare evaluations of employee performance by individuals and groups of supervisors, analyzing a formal model and running a laboratory experiment. The model predicts that multirater evaluations are more precise than single-rater evaluations if groups rationally aggregate their signals about employee performance. Our controlled laboratory experiment confirms this prediction and finds evidence that this can indeed be attributed to accurate information processing in the group. Moreover, when employee compensation depends on evaluations, multirater evaluations tend to be associated with higher performance.
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