Can Technology Solve the Principal-Agent Problem? Evidence from China’s War on Air Pollution
AER: Insights · 2022 · Michael A. Greenstone、Guojun He、Ruixue Jia、Tong Liu
中文摘要
我们研究了自动空气污染监测系统的引入以应对地方层面可能存在的篡改行为，这是中国“蓝天保卫战”的一个核心特征。利用基于城市层面自动化监测实施日变化的654个断点回归设计，我们发现自动化后报告的PM10浓度立即且持续增加了35%。此外，自动监测系统的引入增加了对口罩和空气净化器的在线搜索，这些是购买行为的强预测指标。总体而言，我们的研究结果表明，在自动化之前存在偏差和不完善的信息导致了防御措施投资不足，可能会带来显著的福利成本。（JEL D82, O13, P28, Q53, Q55, Q58）
Abstract
We examine the introduction of automatic air pollution monitoring to counter suspected tampering at the local level, a central feature of China’s “war on pollution.” Exploiting 654 regression discontinuity designs based on city-level variation in the day that monitoring was automated, we find an immediate and lasting increase of 35 percent in reported PM10 concentrations post-automation. Moreover, automation’s introduction increased online searches for face masks and air filters, which are strong predictors of purchases. Overall, our findings suggest that the biased and imperfect information prior to automation led to suboptimal investments in defensive measures, plausibly imposing meaningful welfare costs. (JEL D82, O13, P28, Q53, Q55, Q58)