中文摘要
我们通过考察医院并购来检验雇主整合后工资增长是否会放缓。我们发现，在满足以下两个条件的情形下存在工资增长放缓的证据：(i) 并购导致的集中度上升幅度较大，且 (ii) 工人技能具有行业专用性。在所有其他情形下，我们无法拒绝工资效应为零的原假设。我们考察了替代性解释，发现所观察到的模式不太可能由与并购相关的其他变化（而非劳动力市场势力）来解释。在工会势力较强的市场中，工资增长放缓的幅度被削弱；而在不改变本地雇主集中度的市场外并购之后，工资增长并未下降。(JEL G34, I11, J22, J24, J31, J42, R32)
Abstract
We test whether wage growth slows following employer consolidation by examining hospital mergers. We find evidence of reduced wage growth in cases where both (i) the increase in concentration induced by the merger is large and (ii) workers’ skills are industry-specific. In all other cases, we fail to reject zero wage effects. We consider alternative explanations and find that the observed patterns are unlikely to be explained by merger-related changes besides labor market power. Wage growth slowdowns are attenuated in markets with strong labor unions, and wage growth does not decline after out-of-market mergers that leave local employer concentration unchanged. (JEL G34, I11, J22, J24, J31, J42, R32)