American Economic Journal: Economic Policy · 2022 · Arik M. Levinson、Emilson Caputo Delfino Silva
中文摘要
理论上, 关注不平等的监管机构会偏离有效的两部制资费, 收取低于有效水平的固定月费和高于有效水平的每千瓦时价格。为量化这一关系, 我们构建了一个衡量公用事业资费再分配程度的指标: “电力基尼系数”。电力基尼系数较高的公用事业公司会把更多成本从用电量相对较少的家庭转移到用电量较多的家庭。在实践中, 付费用户收入更不平等的美国公用事业公司, 其电力基尼系数更高。但电力需求与收入之间仅存在松散的相关关系, 这意味着电价是一种间接且无效的应对收入不平等的政策。(JEL D31, L11, L94, L98)
Abstract
In theory, regulators concerned about inequality will deviate from efficient two-part tariffs, charging lower-than-efficient fixed monthly fees and higher-than-efficient per-kilowatt-hour prices. To quantify that relationship, we develop a measure of the redistributive extent of utility tariffs: the “electric Gini.” Utilities with higher electric Ginis shift more costs from households using relatively little electricity to households using more. In practice, US utilities whose ratepayers have more unequal incomes have higher electric Ginis. But electricity demand is only loosely correlated with income, which means that electricity prices are an indirect and ineffective policy for countering income inequality. (JEL D31, L11, L94, L98)