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提高门槛: 最低工资与雇主的雇佣标准

Raising the Bar: Minimum Wages and Employers’ Hiring Standards
American Economic Journal: Economic Policy · 2022 · Sebastian Butschek

中文摘要

许多学者研究了最低工资的就业效应, 但对其如何影响新雇员工的构成却知之甚少。我以工人固定效应作为工人生产率的代理变量, 考察德国引入最低工资是否提高了雇佣标准。对于被雇佣的生产率最低的工人, 最低工资导致其在生产率分布中的位置移动了 4 个百分位点。若使用工人生产率的常规可观测指标进行衡量, 这一上升会被遗漏。在改革前筛选强度越高的情况下, 效应越大——表明这是雇主的反应。这种更具选择性的雇佣, 为生产率最低的新雇员工抵消了约三分之二的更高工资成本。(JEL J23, J24, J31, J38, M51)

Abstract

Many scholars have studied the employment effects of minimum wages, but little is known about effects on the composition of hires. I investigate whether Germany’s minimum wage introduction raised hiring standards, using worker fixed effects as a proxy for worker productivity. For the least productive workers hired, the minimum wage led to a 4 percentile point shift in the productivity distribution. This increase is missed using standard observable measures of worker productivity. The effects are larger with greater pre-reform screening intensity—indicating an employer response. This more selective hiring compensates about two-thirds of higher wage costs for the least productive hires. (JEL J23, J24, J31, J38, M51)
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