中文摘要
自我选择模型预测, 工资结构平坦的职业会吸引平均能力较低的劳动者。然而, 在学术界和公务员等某些显要职业中, 工资结构虽然平坦, 平均技能水平却很高。本文考察社会地位关切能否解释这一谜题。我发现, 职业内地位虽使平坦工资职业能够吸引以高技能为主的劳动者, 但代价是总体上只能吸引到很少的劳动者。然而, 如果劳动者既关心职业内地位又关心职业间地位, 那么支付平坦工资的职业规模可以任意扩大, 并能吸引平均技能较高的劳动者。我由此得出结论: 职业内与职业间的地位关切互为补充。
Abstract
Abstract Models of self-selection predict that occupations with flat wage schedules attract workers of lower average ability. However, in certain prominent occupations such as academia and the civil service, wages are flat yet the average skill level is high. In this paper, I examine whether social status concerns can explain this puzzle. I find that within-occupation status allows flat wage occupations to attract predominantly high-skilled workers, but only at the cost of attracting few workers overall. If, however, workers care about both within- and between-occupation status then occupations paying flat wages can be arbitrarily large and attract workers of high average skill. I conclude that within- and between-occupation status concerns act as complements.