中文摘要
公立学校择校常常产生既不公平也无效率的学生匹配结果。效率调整的延迟接受机制允许学生同意放弃那些对其匹配结果没有影响的优先权。近期快速兴起的一批文献将效率调整的延迟接受机制置于择校中效率与公平权衡的核心。与此同时, 佛兰德教育部已在比利时迈出实施该算法的第一步。我们首次提供了关于效率调整的延迟接受机制与著名的延迟接受机制相对表现的实验证据。我们发现, 尽管效率调整的延迟接受机制并不具备抗操纵性, 但其效率与真实报告率均高于延迟接受机制。当优先权放弃被强制执行时, 相较于学生可以规避放弃优先权的效率调整延迟接受机制变体, 效率进一步提高, 而真实报告率则有所下降。我们的结果对抗操纵性作为真实报告前提条件的重要性提出了挑战, 并预示着效率与易受偏好操纵性之间存在一种新的权衡。
Abstract
Abstract Public school choice often yields student assignments that are neither fair nor efficient. The efficiency-adjusted deferred acceptance mechanism allows students to consent to waive priorities that have no effect on their assignments. A burgeoning recent literature places the efficiency-adjusted deferred acceptance mechanism at the centre of the trade-off between efficiency and fairness in school choice. Meanwhile, the Flemish Ministry of Education has taken the first steps to implement this algorithm in Belgium. We provide the first experimental evidence on the performance of the efficiency-adjusted deferred acceptance mechanism against the celebrated deferred acceptance mechanism. We find that both efficiency and truth-telling rates are higher under the efficiency-adjusted deferred acceptance mechanism than under the deferred acceptance mechanism, even though the efficiency-adjusted deferred acceptance mechanism is not strategy proof. When the priority waiver is enforced, efficiency further increases, while truth-telling rates decrease relative to variants of the efficiency-adjusted deferred acceptance mechanism where students can dodge the waiver. Our results challenge the importance of strategy proofness as a prerequisite for truth telling and portend a new trade-off between efficiency and vulnerability to preference manipulation.