Do Women Respond Less to Performance Pay? Building Evidence from Multiple Experiments
中文摘要
现有实证研究提出了这样一个假说: 绩效工资无论带来何种产出收益, 都可能扩大性别收入差距, 因为女性对激励的反应可能较弱。我们通过汇总现有以男性与女性为被试的绩效激励实验的证据来评估这一可能性。利用贝叶斯分层模型, 我们同时估计了平均效应以及各研究之间的异质性。我们发现, 性别反应差异接近于零, 各研究之间的异质性也很小, 而绩效工资平均使产出增加0.36个标准差。因此, 无论对男性还是女性, 数据都支持代理理论。(JEL C11, C90, J16, J31, J33)
Abstract
Existing empirical work raises the hypothesis that performance pay—whatever its output gains—may widen the gender earnings gap because women may respond less to incentives. We evaluate this possibility by aggregating evidence from existing experiments on performance incentives with male and female subjects. Using a Bayesian hierarchical model, we estimate both the average effect and heterogeneity across studies. We find that the gender response difference is close to zero and heterogeneity across studies is small, while performance pay increases output by 0.36 standard deviations on average. The data thus support agency theory for men and women alike. (JEL C11, C90, J16, J31, J33)