中文摘要
本文研究政治扭曲在推动非洲经济增长与发展中的作用。我们首先讨论基于长期结构性因素(如殖民前与殖民时期制度,或族群多样性)的现有理论可能无法捕捉该地区新的数据模式,包括政治体制与增长模式的变化,以及历史经验相似的地区之间这些方面的差异。我们随后论证,一个聚焦于政治扭曲(即政治激励如何影响资源配置与经济结果)的框架可能具有多重益处:它涵盖实践中观察到的诸多扭曲,包括政治恩庇、合同执行力度的差异以及政治关联对企业结果的影响;它统一了非洲与其他地区的研究结果;并且它为政策分析留下了广阔空间。最后,我们概述了可能遏制此类扭曲的改革,包括竞选融资规则的改革、官僚体制改革、自由贸易协定以及技术。
Abstract
This article studies the role of political distortions in driving economic growth and development in Africa. We first discuss how existing theories based on long-run structural factors (e.g., pre-colonial and colonial institutions, or ethnic diversity) may not capture new data patterns in the region, including changes to political regimes, growth patterns, and their variation across regions with similar historical experiences. We then argue that a framework focused on political distortions (i.e., how political incentives impact resource allocation and economic outcomes) may have multiple benefits: it encapsulates many distortions observed in practice, including patronage, variations in contract enforcement and the role of political connections in firm outcomes; it unifies results in Africa and elsewhere; and it leaves a wide scope for policy analysis. We conclude by overviewing reforms that may curb such distortions, including changes to campaign financing rules, bureaucratic reform, free trade agreements, and technology.