中文摘要
我们提出并实证实施了一个均衡劳动力市场搜寻模型,其中面临医疗支出冲击的风险厌恶工人与就是否提供健康保险作出决策的企业相匹配。我们利用估计出的模型评估多项医疗改革方案(包括2010年《平价医疗法案》(ACA))的均衡影响。我们将对ACA早期影响的估计结果用作模型验证。我们发现,基于收入的健康保险保费补贴对ACA的可持续性至关重要;而即便没有个人强制参保或雇主强制条款,ACA仍能大幅降低无保险率。
Abstract
We present and empirically implement an equilibrium labor market search model where risk-averse workers facing medical expenditure shocks are matched with firms making health insurance coverage decisions. We use our estimated model to evaluate the equilibrium impact of many health care reform proposals, including the 2010 Affordable Care Act (ACA). We use the estimates of the early impact of the ACA as a model validation. We find that income-based subsidies for health insurance premiums are crucial for the sustainability of the ACA, while the ACA can still substantially reduce the uninsured rate without the individual or the employer mandate.