中文摘要
我研究寡头之间的重复竞争。模型的唯一新颖之处在于企业可能破产并永久退出:企业熬过价格战的概率取决于其财务实力,而财务实力随时间随机变化。在包括无进入在内的一些条件下,一个"反民间定理" (anti-folk theorem) 成立:当企业足够有耐心、从而实力水平变化相对较快时,每个纳什均衡都涉及一场即刻爆发的价格战,并持续到至多只剩一家企业为止。令人惊讶的是,进入的可能性可能促进合谋,缺乏耐心亦然。该模型能够解释所观察到的一些合谋与掠夺模式。
Abstract
I study repeated competition among oligopolists. The only novelty is that firms may go bankrupt and permanently exit: the probability that a firm survives a price war depends on its financial strength, which varies stochastically over time. Under some conditions including no entry, an anti-folk theorem holds: when firms are patient, so that strength levels change relatively quickly, every Nash equilibrium involves an immediate price war that lasts until at most one firm remains. Surprisingly, the possibility of entry may facilitate collusion, as may impatience. The model can explain some observed patterns of collusion and predation.