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弃新迎旧?超国家银行监管与企业投资构成

Out with the new, in with the old? Supranational bank supervision and the composition of firm investment
Journal of International Economics · 2026 · Miguel Ampudia、Thorsten Beck、Alexander Popov

中文摘要

利用欧元区设立单一监管机制 (SSM) 所产生的外生变异,我们发现,与从受国家监管的银行借款的企业相比,从受超国家监管的银行借款的企业降低了其无形资产占比。该效应并非在监管改革之前即已存在,且在非 SSM 辖区中并不成立。投资从无形资产转移的现象在小型和年轻企业中更强,并且似乎由贷款的短期减少和抵押品标准的持续性提高所驱动。

Abstract

Using exogenous variation generated by the creation of the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) in the euro area, we find that relative to firms borrowing from banks subject to national supervision, firms borrowing from banks subject to supranational supervision reduce their share of intangible assets. This effect does not pre-date the supervisory reform and it does not obtain in non-SSM jurisdictions. The reallocation of investment away from intangible assets is stronger for small and young firms and appears to be driven by a short-term reduction in lending and a persistent increase in collateral standards.
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