市场波动下的灵活合约与质量升级：来自塞内加尔的实验证据
Flexible contracting and quality upgrading under market volatility: Experimental evidence from Senegal
Journal of Development Economics · 2026 · [{"name": "Joshua Deutschmann", "affiliation": ["University of Chicago"]}, {"name": "Tanguy Bernard", "affiliation": ["Université de Bordeaux"]}, {"name": "Ouambi Yameogo", "affiliation": ["Islamic Development Bank"]}]
中文摘要
我们在塞内加尔的花生生产者与合作社中开展了一项随机实验，以应对食品安全管理和遵守国际质量标准方面的障碍。我们向生产者提供一项捆绑合同，将信贷、推广服务与价格溢价保证结合起来，以鼓励其使用一种新的食品安全技术。该合同在产出销售方面具有灵活性：尽管提供合同的合作社试图汇总成员的产出，但农户在有更高价格机会时仍可加以利用。我们发现，被随机提供该合同的生产者购买该技术的可能性显著更高，通过合作社销售的产出更多，并且在因农业气候条件导致质量原本较低的地区，更有可能遵守国际食品安全标准。实验两年后，合作社将一项类似合同推广至所有成员，但取消了价格溢价，并采用间接沟通策略。相对于实验期间，对该技术的需求有所下降，但在此前接受处理的农户中仍持续保持较高水平。
Abstract
We conduct a randomized experiment with groundnut producers and cooperatives in Senegal to address barriers to managing food safety and complying with international quality standards. We offer producers a bundled contract combining credit, extension, and a price premium guarantee to encourage use of a new food safety technology. The contract is flexible regarding sales of output: while cooperatives offering the contract seek to aggregate members’ output, farmers can seize higher price opportunities when available. We find that producers randomly offered the contract are significantly more likely to purchase the technology, sell more output via cooperatives, and are more likely to comply with international food safety standards in areas where quality would otherwise be lower due to agro-climatic conditions. Two years after our experiment, the cooperatives scaled a similar contract to all members but without a price premium and with an indirect communications strategy. Demand for the technology fell relative to the experiment, but remained persistently higher among previously-treated farmers.