中文摘要
我们研究在招聘中具有管理者自由裁量权的锦标赛。管理者从候选人池中选出一名同事,随后在Lazear–Rosen式锦标赛中与其竞争,奖金等于总产出的一定份额。追求利润最大化的委托人设定奖金份额,同时设定给予管理者的先发优势(或让先劣势)——即在产出比较中的一种优势(或劣势)。先发优势通过三条渠道影响产出:(i)激励管理者,(ii)削弱新员工的积极性,以及(iii)促使管理者聘用更强的候选人。在聘用最强候选人之前,聘用效应对削弱效应占优;超过该点之后,任何进一步的先发优势对新员工的削弱作用都大于对管理者的激励作用。因此,最优合同所给予的先发优势恰好足以促使管理者聘用最强的候选人。
Abstract
We study tournaments with managerial discretion in hiring. A manager selects a coworker from a pool of candidates and then competes against him in a Lazear–Rosen–style tournament with a prize equal to a share of total output. A profit-maximizing principal sets the prize share together with a head start (or handicap)—an advantage (or disadvantage) in the output comparison—granted to the manager. The head start affects output through three channels: (i) encouraging the manager, (ii) discouraging the new hire, and (iii) inducing the manager to hire a stronger candidate. The hiring effect dominates the discouragement effect until the strongest candidate is hired; beyond that point, any further head start discourages the new hire more than it encourages the manager. The optimal contract therefore grants a head start just large enough to induce the manager to hire the strongest candidate.