中文摘要
本文考察个人影响力下降如何促使政治人物将公共部门就业用作补偿性工具。识别策略利用巴西一项根据人口规模对市议会席位数设定上限的改革，该改革产生了政治影响力的准实验变异。我将市议员的选举记录、约20万人的竞选捐款数据与匹配的劳动力市场行政记录相结合。影响力下降使竞选支持者获得公共部门工作的可能性提高约26%。这些收益集中于管理和监督职位，也包括对已就业内部人员的向上调配，并与较低的教育水平以及更严重的技能错配和薪酬错配相关。结果表明，公共部门就业是一种以人事安排为基础的分配工具，政治人物借此抵消影响力的减弱，并由此影响官僚体系质量和治理。• 立法影响力下降会增加对政治支持者的公共部门雇用。• 当预算扩张受到约束时，政治人物会以公共部门职位替代财政工具。• 就业收益集中于自由裁量权较大、影响力较强的行政职位。• 意识形态一致的支持者从公共部门任命中获益更多。• 这些影响持续至选举之后，并改变官僚体系的人员构成。
Abstract
This paper examines how reduced individual influence leads politicians to use public-sector employment as a compensatory instrument. Identification exploits a Brazilian reform imposing population-based ceilings on municipal council size, generating quasi-experimental variation in political leverage. I combine electoral records for city councilors, campaign donation data on roughly 200,000 individuals, and matched administrative labor-market records. Reduced influence raises the likelihood that campaign supporters obtain public-sector jobs by about 26%. These gains concentrate in managerial and supervisory positions, include upward reallocation of already employed insiders, and are associated with lower education and greater skill and pay mismatch. The results show that public employment operates as a personnel-based distributive instrument, through which politicians offset diminished influence, with consequences for bureaucratic quality and governance. • Reduced legislative influence increases public-sector hiring of political supporters. • Politicians substitute fiscal tools with public jobs when budget expansion is constrained. • Employment gains concentrate in discretionary, high-leverage administrative positions. • Ideologically aligned supporters benefit more from public-sector appointments. • Effects persist beyond elections and alter bureaucratic composition.