Journal of Development Economics · 2026 · [{"name": "Caíque Melo", "affiliation": ["Bocconi University"]}]
中文摘要
本文考察个人影响力的下降如何促使政治家将公共部门就业用作一种补偿性工具。识别策略利用巴西一项改革——该改革依据人口规模对市议会席位数设定上限——从而在政治影响力(政治杠杆)上产生了准实验变异。本文结合了市议员的选举记录、约20万名个人的竞选捐款数据，以及匹配的行政劳动力市场记录。影响力的下降使竞选支持者获得公共部门工作的可能性提高约26%。这些收益集中于管理与监督岗位，包括对已在职内部人员的向上再配置，并与较低的教育水平以及更大的技能错配与薪酬错配相关。结果表明，公共就业作为一种以人员为基础的分配性工具运作，政治家借此抵消自身影响力的下降，并对官僚质量与治理产生影响。• 立法影响力的下降增加了对政治支持者的公共部门雇用。• 当预算扩张受到约束时，政治家以公共部门岗位替代财政工具。• 就业收益集中于具有自由裁量权、高杠杆的行政岗位。• 意识形态一致的支持者从公共部门任命中获益更多。• 相关效应在选举结束后依然持续，并改变了官僚队伍的构成。
Abstract
This paper examines how reduced individual influence leads politicians to use public-sector employment as a compensatory instrument. Identification exploits a Brazilian reform imposing population-based ceilings on municipal council size, generating quasi-experimental variation in political leverage. I combine electoral records for city councilors, campaign donation data on roughly 200,000 individuals, and matched administrative labor-market records. Reduced influence raises the likelihood that campaign supporters obtain public-sector jobs by about 26%. These gains concentrate in managerial and supervisory positions, include upward reallocation of already employed insiders, and are associated with lower education and greater skill and pay mismatch. The results show that public employment operates as a personnel-based distributive instrument, through which politicians offset diminished influence, with consequences for bureaucratic quality and governance. • Reduced legislative influence increases public-sector hiring of political supporters. • Politicians substitute fiscal tools with public jobs when budget expansion is constrained. • Employment gains concentrate in discretionary, high-leverage administrative positions. • Ideologically aligned supporters benefit more from public-sector appointments. • Effects persist beyond elections and alter bureaucratic composition.