Governments’ home bias and efficiency losses: Evidence from national and subnational governments
Journal of International Economics · 2026 · Manuel García‐Santana、Marta Santamaría
中文摘要
利用法国和西班牙授标的一百万份采购合同,我们量化了本地偏好在解释政府购买中的重要性。首先,我们利用“本地”对次国家级政府和国家政府含义不同这一事实,通过比较某一地区内本地与非本地企业向国家机构和次国家级机构销售的情况,识别二者的相对本地偏好。其次,我们利用法国大区重组这一事件,估计改革后“新本地”企业向政府销售的情况。基于量化贸易模型,我们发现政府的本地偏好使本地支出份额提高29%,并使政府产出减少8%。
Abstract
Using one million procurement contracts awarded in France and Spain, we quantify the importance of home bias in explaining governments’ purchases. First, we exploit that “home” has a different meaning for subnational and national governments and identify their relative home bias by comparing how local and non-local establishments sell to national and subnational agencies within a region. Second, we exploit a reorganization of French regions, to estimate how “new local” establishments sell to governments after the reform. Using a quantitative trade model, we find that governments’ home bias increases local expenditures shares by 29% and reduces governments’ output by 8%.