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警察队伍中的绩效激励薪酬

Incentive‐Based Compensation in Police Forces
Journal of Policy Analysis and Management · 2026 · Sandro Cabral、Marcelo Marchesini da Costa、Sergio Pinheiro Firpo、Joana da Costa Martins Monteiro、Leonardo Viotti

中文摘要

世界各国政府正越来越多地将管理原则应用于警务工作,包括绩效管理系统和财务激励。我们研究以犯罪减少为条件的绩效奖金资格是否改善了警务工作成效。我们采用准实验设计,并使用来自巴西的行政数据,评估了一项以暴力死亡、机动车抢劫和街头抢劫的减少为条件的激励薪酬方案。我们的结果显示,有资格获得奖金的警区在目标犯罪和非目标犯罪上均经历了统计显著的减少,且这种效应在学期末激励力度更大时更强。尽管有一些证据表明在街头抢劫的分类重新认定中存在策略性行为,但这一行为并未削弱该方案的整体有效性。总体而言,我们的发现凸显了财务激励在重塑警察行为和减少犯罪方面的潜力。

Abstract

ABSTRACT Governments worldwide are increasingly applying management principles to policing, including performance management systems and financial incentives. We study whether eligibility for performance‐based bonuses tied to crime reduction improves police outcomes. Using a quasi‐experimental design and administrative data from Brazil, we evaluate an incentive‐based compensation program that conditioned bonuses on reductions in violent deaths, vehicle robberies, and street robberies. Our results show that police districts eligible for bonuses experienced significant reductions in both targeted and nontargeted crimes, with stronger effects at the end of semester when incentives are steeper. While there is some evidence of gaming in the reclassification of street robberies, this behavior does not undermine the program's overall effectiveness. Overall, our findings highlight the potential of financial incentives to reshape police behavior and reduce crime.
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