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没收中央银行资产?

Seizing central bank assets?
Journal of International Economics · 2026 · Massimo Ferrari Minesso、Tobias Krahnke、Arnaud Mehl、Isabel S. Vansteenkiste

中文摘要

我们研究对中央银行资产实施制裁的全球影响。我们构建了一个涵盖1914—2024年中央银行资产冻结与没收的数据库。我们表明,对当今俄罗斯中央银行资产实施的冻结规模在历史上极为罕见,且非交战国从未在一场正在进行的战争中没收中央银行资产以资助第三国的重建。我们提出一个三国DSGE模型,以理解对中央银行资产实施制裁的全球影响,并厘清其宏观经济机制。该模型的一个洞见是,没收中央银行资产在一般均衡下可能对制裁国产生不利影响。校准后的模型模拟表明,没收俄罗斯被冻结的主权资产可能导致制裁国政府债券利率上升。约三年之后,利息支出的增加可能超过被没收资产的金额。

Abstract

We study the global impacts of sanctions on central bank assets. We build a database on freezes and seizures of central bank assets spanning 1914–2024. We show that the scale of the freeze on today’s Central Bank of Russia’s assets is rarely seen in history and that non-belligerent countries have never seized central bank assets to finance reconstruction in a third country in an ongoing war. We propose a three-country DSGE model to understand the global impacts of sanctions on central bank assets and tease out the macroeconomic mechanisms. One insight of the model is that seizing central bank assets can result in adverse effects on the sanctioning country in general equilibrium. Calibrated model simulations suggest that seizing Russia’s immobilized sovereign assets could result in higher interest rates on sanctioning countries’ government bonds. The increase in interest rate payments could surpass the assets’ amount seized after about three years.
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