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雨中的策略性排污

Strategic emissions in the rain
Journal of Development Economics · 2026 · Runhao Zhao、Ye Yuan

中文摘要

企业策略性地选择排放地点与时机以规避环境规制。我们揭示了一种新型的时间性规避行为:企业在强降雨期间向水体排放废水。通过采用双重差分(DID)方法,并分析高频水质监测数据与降雨数据,我们发现,与污染企业密度较低的集水区相比,污染企业密集的集水区水污染物浓度上升更为显著。我们的实证发现与一个简化模型的预测一致:该模型表明,在基于阈值的监测制度下,污染者会利用降雨的稀释效应策略性地增加废水排放。我们估计,这种隐蔽的“雨中排污”行为可抵消中国年度减排目标的43%。

Abstract

Firms strategically locate and time their emissions to evade environmental regulations. We uncover a novel form of temporal evasion: firms discharge wastewater into waterways during periods of heavy rains. By employing a difference-in-differences approach and analyzing high-frequency water quality monitoring and rainfall data, we find that water pollution concentrations rise more significantly in catchment areas densely populated by polluting firms relative to low-density areas. Our empirical findings align with a stylized model that predicts polluters exploit the dilution effects of rainfall to strategically increase wastewater discharge under a threshold-based monitoring system. We estimate that this covert “polluting-in-the-rain” behavior can offset 43% of China’s annual emission reduction targets.
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