中文摘要
我们研究当行为人存在偏向且能够核实信息时,一条真实信息与一条虚假信息(错误信息)的扩散。由于虚假信息的接收者在核实后会知晓真相,错误信息的更高流行程度反而可能提高真相的流行程度。我们揭示了出现这种情形的条件,并讨论其政策含义。具体而言,以最大化真相流行程度为目标的计划者,在满足以下条件时应允许错误信息传播:未核实的信息可能被忽略、信息传递水平相对较低,且计划者用于诱导核实的预算既不太低也不太高。同质性会加剧错误信息的传播,但同时也促进真相的扩散,并使关于核实效应的结论与之类似。
Abstract
We study the diffusion of a true and a false message (misinformation) when agents are biased and able to verify messages. As a recipient of a false message who verifies it becomes informed of the truth, a higher prevalence of misinformation can increase the prevalence of the truth. We uncover conditions such that this happens and discuss policy implications. Specifically, a planner aiming to maximize the prevalence of the truth should allow misinformation to circulate if: non-verified messages may be ignored, transmission of information is relatively low, and the planner’s budget to induce verification is neither too low nor too high. Homophily increases the spread of misinformation, but also facilitates diffusion of truth, and leads to similar results on the effect of verification.