Unsecured Credit and the Social Safety Net in U.S. States
American Sociological Review · 2026 · Alec P. Rhodes、Davon Norris、Jason N. Houle、Rachel E. Dwyer、Sarah K. Bruch、Lawrence M. Berger
中文摘要
美国的低收入家庭依靠公共和私人资源来应对经济风险。跨国比较学者提出了“信贷—福利国家权衡”的概念:当国家福利支持不足时,信贷市场的重要性尤为突出。美国在这方面经常被着重提及,因为其以市场为先的安全网往往不尽完善。然而,信贷市场与安全网在美国各州之间均存在高度的不平等与分割。我们利用一个全国性的大规模信贷记录数据样本——该样本使我们能够区分不同的信贷工具——为信贷与福利国家之间的关系提供了新的经验洞见。我们将这些数据与一个涵盖各州安全网的综合性数据集相连接,其中包含具有可比性的项目支持力度指标。我们估计了双向固定效应模型,利用各州内部安全网支持力度随时间的变化。我们发现,生活在安全网支持力度更大的州,与使用高成本替代性发薪日贷款、分期贷款和个人金融贷款的概率较低,以及获得主流信用卡的概率较高相关联,这在低收入家庭中尤为明显。在美国安全网相对不足的背景下,州安全网支持力度对人们是否借贷的影响,不如对其使用何种信贷工具的影响大。我们的研究结果表明,限制美国安全网的努力可能会增加低收入家庭对高成本贷款的依赖,进一步加重这些家庭所承担的不平等的利息与费用负担。
Abstract
Low-income households in the United States draw on public and private resources to manage economic risk. Cross-national scholars describe a "credit-welfare state tradeoff" where credit markets become particularly important when state benefits are less supportive. The United States is frequently highlighted in this regard, with its often-inadequate market-first safety net. Both credit markets and the safety net are, however, highly unequal and segmented across U.S. states. We provide new empirical insights on the credit-welfare state nexus by leveraging a large national sample of credit record data that allows us to distinguish between credit instruments. We link these data to a comprehensive dataset on state safety nets with comparable measures of program supportiveness. We estimate two-way fixed-effects models that exploit temporal variation within states in safety net supportiveness. We find that living in states with more supportive safety nets is associated with a lower probability of high-cost alternative payday, installment and personal finance loan use, and a higher probability of mainstream credit card access, particularly among low-income households. In the context of the relative inadequacy of the U.S. safety net, state safety net supportiveness matters less for whether people borrow than for what credit instruments they use. Our findings suggest that efforts to restrict the U.S. safety net are likely to increase reliance on high-cost loans among low-income households, furthering the unequal burden of interest and fees levied on these households.