Journal of the European Economic Association · 2025 · Nikolaj Broberg、Vincent Pons、Clémence Tricaud
中文摘要
本文研究竞选资金规则对选举结果的影响。在法国地方选举中，人口超过9,000人的选区内参选的候选人面临竞选支出限制，并有资格获得公共报销。利用人口门槛附近的断点回归（RDD）设计，我们发现这些规则提高了选举竞争程度，使上一轮选举的第二名以及省级选举中的新候选人受益，同时对选举结果的极化程度以及胜选者的代表性和素质均无影响。现任者再次当选的可能性降低，原因在于他们参选的可能性较低，且在参选的情况下获得的选票份额也更低。这些结果似乎是由竞选支出报销而非支出限制所驱动的。我们在市镇选举中未发现此类效应，将其归因于更高的竞选支出、竞选资金边际回报递减，以及采用比例代表制名单投票而非相对多数投票制。
Abstract
Abstract This paper investigates the effects of campaign finance rules on electoral outcomes. In French local elections, candidates competing in districts above 9,000 inhabitants face spending limits and are eligible for public reimbursement. Using an RDD around the population threshold, we find that these rules increase competitiveness and benefit the runner-up of the previous race as well as new candidates in departmental elections, while leaving the polarization of results and winners’ representativeness and quality unaffected. Incumbents are less likely to get reelected because they are less likely to run and obtain a lower vote share, conditional on running. These results appear to be driven by the reimbursement of campaign expenditures, not spending limits. We do not find such effects in municipal elections, which we attribute to higher spending, decreasing marginal returns of campaign money, and the use of a proportional list system instead of plurality voting.