支出限制、公共资金与选举结果
Spending Limits, Public Funding, and Election Outcomes
Journal of the European Economic Association · 2025 · [{"name": "Nikolaj Broberg", "affiliation": ["European University Institute"]}, {"name": "Vincent Pons", "affiliation": []}, {"name": "Clémence Tricaud", "affiliation": ["University of California, Los Angeles"]}]
中文摘要
摘要 本文考察竞选财务规则对选举结果的影响。在法国地方选举中, 居民人数超过9,000人的选区中参选的候选人面临支出上限, 并有资格获得公共报销。利用围绕人口门槛的断点回归, 我们发现, 这些规则提高了竞争性, 在省级选举中有利于上一次竞选的第二名以及新候选人, 同时不影响结果的极化程度以及获胜者的代表性与质量。现任者连任的可能性降低, 因为他们参选的可能性更低, 且在参选条件下得票率也更低。这些结果似乎由竞选支出的报销所驱动, 而非支出上限。我们在市镇选举中未发现此类效应, 我们将其归因于更高的支出、竞选资金的边际回报递减, 以及采用比例代表名单制而非相对多数决制。
Abstract
Abstract This paper investigates the effects of campaign finance rules on electoral outcomes. In French local elections, candidates competing in districts above 9,000 inhabitants face spending limits and are eligible for public reimbursement. Using an RDD around the population threshold, we find that these rules increase competitiveness and benefit the runner-up of the previous race as well as new candidates in departmental elections, while leaving the polarization of results and winners’ representativeness and quality unaffected. Incumbents are less likely to get reelected because they are less likely to run and obtain a lower vote share, conditional on running. These results appear to be driven by the reimbursement of campaign expenditures, not spending limits. We do not find such effects in municipal elections, which we attribute to higher spending, decreasing marginal returns of campaign money, and the use of a proportional list system instead of plurality voting.