Strengthening police oversight: The impacts of misconduct investigators on police officer behavior
中文摘要
我们研究公民投诉调查员如何影响芝加哥警官的行为。我们利用投诉被准随机分配给主管调查员的机制,并利用主管调查员是否倾向于获取能够证实投诉的宣誓书所产生的变异。当被指派的调查员通过获取宣誓书启动更多调查时,被指控的警官在调查开始后的前三个月内累积的投诉数量更少。我们发现,在丑闻发生之前,被分配给高调查率的主管调查员会导致警官实施更多逮捕;然而,丑闻发生后这一效应发生逆转。我们的研究结果表明,警察监督机构能够在常规监督环境下改善警官行为,但在监督强度提高的环境下可能适得其反。
Abstract
Abstract We study how civilian complaint investigators affect officer behavior in Chicago. We exploit quasi‐random assignment of complaints to supervising investigators and use variation in whether supervisors tend to acquire sworn affidavits that substantiate the complaints. When the assigned investigator opens more investigations through obtaining affidavits, accused officers accumulate fewer complaints in the first three months of the investigation. We find that, prior to a scandal, assignment to high‐investigation supervisors causes officers to make more arrests. However, this reverses after the scandal. Our findings suggest that police watchdogs can improve officer behavior in ordinary oversight environments but may backfire in heightened oversight environments.