中文摘要
本文研究存在公平关切时的高管薪酬：如果首席执行官的工资低于其认为公平的产出份额，他就会承受负效用，且负效用随这一差距扩大而增加。公平关切并不总会带来公平工资；相反，企业以在低产出时支付不公平工资相威胁，促使首席执行官付出努力。合约有时涉及以绩效达标为归属条件的股权：如果产出足够高，首席执行官获得按固定比例计算的产出份额，否则报酬为零。即使不存在道德风险，合约仍采用绩效薪酬，以应对公平关切并确保首席执行官参与。这解释了为何即使无需努力激励，也会采用绩效薪酬。（JEL D63, D82, D86, G34, M12, M52）
Abstract
This paper studies executive pay with fairness concerns: If the CEO's wage falls below a perceived fair share of output, he suffers disutility that is increasing in the discrepancy. Fairness concerns do not always lead to fair wages; instead, the firm threatens the CEO with unfair wages for low output to induce effort. The contract sometimes involves performance-vesting equity: The CEO is paid a constant share of output if it is sufficiently high and zero otherwise. Even without moral hazard, the contract features pay-for-performance to address fairness concerns and ensure participation. This rationalizes pay-for-performance even if effort incentives are unnecessary. (JEL D63, D82, D86, G34, M12, M52)