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政策引致报废的外部性:汽车安全检查的案例

Externalities of Policy-Induced Scrappage: The Case of Automotive Safety Inspections
Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists · 2026 · Connor R. Forsythe、Akshaya Jha、Jeremy J. Michalek、Kate S. Whitefoot

中文摘要

许多交通政策通过引致车辆报废率的变化,间接影响出行及由此产生的外部性。我们利用美国各州安全检查计划的交错取消,估计政策引致的车队规模变化对出行和燃料使用的影响。使用第一阶段双重差分模型,我们估计取消安全检查要求使车队规模平均增加5%。使用对弱工具稳健的第二阶段工具变量框架,我们可以拒绝车队行驶距离的车队规模弹性高于0.43,以及车队汽油消耗的车队规模弹性高于0.10。我们的估计表明,假设车队规模弹性为1会将取消安全检查的全国总外部性成本高估至少150%,相当于1970年至2017年累计全国总误差超过900亿美元。

Abstract

Many transportation policies indirectly affect travel and resulting externalities by inducing changes in vehicle scrappage rates. We leverage the staggered removal of state-level safety inspection programs across the United States to estimate the effects of policy-induced changes in fleet size on travel and fuel use. Using a first-stage difference-in-differences model, we estimate that the removal of safety inspection requirements causes a 5% increase in fleet size on average. Using a second-stage instrumental variables framework robust to weak instruments, we can reject fleet-size elasticities of fleet travel distance above 0.43 and fleet-size elasticities of fleet gasoline consumption above 0.10. Our estimates suggest that assuming fleet-size elasticities of 1 would overestimate the total national externality costs of removing safety inspections by at least 150%, amounting to a cumulative national aggregate error from 1970 to 2017 exceeding $90 billion.
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