中文摘要
本文提出威权政体中的参与式说服概念,即政权利用受控的沟通来维持其统治。在一个民主化的世代交叠模型中,我们表明,与完全不存在沟通的情形相比,当公民在小圈子内部进行沟通时,政权的存续得以延长。悖论在于,有限的言论自由通过使公民在无意中成为国家宣传的代理人,反而增强了政权的说服力。我们进一步将分析扩展到存在同质性(homophily)或受国家审查的情形。
Abstract
This paper introduces the concept of participatory persuasion in autocracies, where regimes use controlled communication to sustain their rule. In an overlapping-generations model of democratization, we show that the regime’s survival can be prolonged when citizens communicate within small circles compared to a setting in which communication is entirely absent. Paradoxically, limited freedom of speech enhances the regime’s persuasion by turning citizens into inadvertent agents of state propaganda. We further extend the analysis to settings with homophily or under state censorship.