中文摘要
我们将 Carlsson 和 van Damme (1993) 式的全局博弈扩展到如下环境：即使在底层博弈类中不存在占优可解的博弈，风险占优均衡也仍会被选中。底层博弈中收益的离散变化所带来的策略不确定性可以在全局博弈中催生严格占优，并且我们给出了关于收益变化的充分条件，以确保风险占优均衡经由重复占优（iterated dominance）被选出。因此，策略不确定性既催生重复占优，又创造出严格占优行动；与此相对，在迄今的全局博弈中，策略不确定性仅发挥促进重复占优的作用。离散的收益变化尤其容易出现在如下情形：公共物品可以依据状态以不同程度的协调加以提供，从而协调行动之间可能是策略替代的，且存在搭便车激励。我们通过一个程式化的公共物品提供模型来说明上述发现。
Abstract
We extend global games á la Carlsson and van Damme (1993) to environments where the risk-dominant equilibrium is selected even if there is no dominance solvable game in the underlying class of games. Strict dominance can emerge in the global game from strategic uncertainty due to discrete payoff changes in underlying games, and we provide sufficient conditions on payoff changes that warrant iterated dominance of the risk-dominant equilibrium. Thus, strategic uncertainty creates strictly dominant actions as well as fostering iterated dominance, in contrast to global games hitherto where strategic uncertainty does only the latter. Discrete payoff changes tend to arise, in particular, in situations where a public good can be provided with varying degrees of coordination depending on the state, so that coordinating actions can be strategic substitutes and free-riding incentives are present. We illustrate our findings in a stylized public good provision model.