中文摘要
我们研究具有政策动机的委托人选择一名代表, 在多数决规则下的集体机构中就一维政策进行谈判。代表的意识形态通过其自身提案直接影响政策结果, 也通过塑造中位者的预期间接影响政策结果, 而这些预期决定了哪些提案能够通过。这产生了一种权衡: 接近委托人理想点的代表会提出有利于委托人的提案, 但会使极端主义提案获得通过; 而更居中的代表则通过提高中位者的延续价值来约束极端主义。我们证明, 大量委托人严格偏好偏向中心而非偏向自身的代表。对几乎所有委托人而言, 最优代表是唯一的, 随委托人理想点严格递增, 且绝不会偏向远离中心的方向。我们还研究了多个委托人选择代表的竞争性代表制。
Abstract
We study a policy-motivated principal choosing a representative to bargain over one-dimensional policy in a collective body under majority rule. The representative’s ideology affects policy outcomes directly through their own proposal and indirectly by shaping the median’s expectations, determining which proposals pass. This creates a tradeoff: a representative close to the principal’s ideal point makes favorable proposals but permits extremist proposals to pass, while a more centrist representative constrains extremism by improving the median’s continuation value. We show that a wide range of principals strictly prefer representatives biased toward center rather than themselves. The optimal representative is unique for almost all principals, strictly increasing in the principal’s ideal point, and never biased away from center. We also study competitive representation with multiple principals choosing representatives.