中文摘要
游说透明度法规被誉为解决特殊利益集团 (SIGs) 对政策制定影响过大这一担忧的潜在方案。我研究了这些法规如何塑造选民、政客与特殊利益集团之间的策略性互动。通过澄清政策得以实施的过程, 游说透明度有助于选民问责政客并控制特殊利益集团的影响。事后来看, 在获得准入的条件下, 特殊利益集团更偏好在没有游说透明度的情况下运作。事前来看, 它们可能从游说透明度中受益, 因为游说透明度会将选民的责备转而指向政客。然而, 游说透明度标准最终可能损害政客的选举前景, 因而有永不落实的风险, 这或许可以解释为何选民对游说透明度的诉求始终未获回应。
Abstract
Lobbying transparency regulations are hailed as a potential solution to concerns about the excessive influence of special interest groups (SIGs) over policymaking. I study how these regulations shape strategic interactions between voters, politicians and SIGs. By clarifying the process through which a policy was implemented, lobbying transparency helps voters hold politicians accountable and control the influence of SIGs. Ex-post, conditional on access, SIGs prefer to operate without lobbying transparency. Ex-ante, they may benefit from lobbying transparency because it redirects the voters’ blame towards politicians. However, lobbying transparency standards may ultimately hurt the electoral prospects of politicians and thus risk never being implemented, potentially explaining why voters’ demand for it remains unanswered.