The Journal of Finance · 2026 · Edith Hotchkiss、Benjamin Charles Iverson、Zheng Xiang
中文摘要
大多数试图通过破产程序进行重整的美国小企业未能成功重整。第11章V分章 (Subchapter V, 简称 SubV) 通过降低破产成本和谈判摩擦简化了小企业的破产程序， 并使企业家得以保留企业所有权。我们发现， 许多企业在 SubV 下得以重整， 而若无该制度这些企业本将清算。SubV 下的债权人受偿水平与破产后存活率至少不低于传统第11章程序。我们的结果表明， 重整数量的增加与不可存续企业的延续无关， 且谈判能力向小企业主的转移并未使债权人利益受损。
Abstract
A majority of small U.S. businesses attempting to reorganize in bankruptcy fail to do so. Subchapter V of Chapter 11 (SubV) streamlines bankruptcy for small firms by reducing bankruptcy costs and negotiation frictions, and enables entrepreneurs to retain ownership. We show that many businesses reorganize under SubV that otherwise would liquidate. Creditor recoveries and postbankruptcy survival rates are at least as high in SubV as in traditional Chapter 11s. Our results show the increase in reorganizations is not associated with continuation of unviable firms, and that creditors are not harmed by a shift in bargaining power toward small business owners.