中文摘要
我提出一个租赁市场的动态均衡模型, 该模型内生地产生租金违约与驱逐。在模型中, 驱逐保护使驱逐拖欠租金的租客变得更加困难, 但房东面临的更高违约成本会推高均衡租金。我利用关于驱逐、租金和无家可归的微观数据对模型进行量化。我发现, 更强的驱逐保护会加剧住房不安全并降低福利。这一结果的关键经验驱动因素是租金拖欠背后风险的持续性。租房援助能够降低住房不安全并改善福利, 因为它降低了租客事前违约的可能性。
Abstract
ABSTRACT I propose a dynamic equilibrium model of rental markets that endogenously gives rise to defaults on rents and evictions. In the model, eviction protections make it harder to evict delinquent renters, but higher default costs to landlords increase equilibrium rents. I quantify the model using micro data on evictions, rents, and homelessness. I find that stronger eviction protections exacerbate housing insecurity and lower welfare. The key empirical driver of this result is the persistent nature of risk underlying rent delinquencies. Rental assistance reduces housing insecurity and improves welfare because it lowers the likelihood that renters default ex ante.