Journal of International Economics · 2026 · Jean‐Marc Solleder、Fulvio Silvy、Marcelo Olarreaga
中文摘要
对Grossman与Helpman(1994)“保护待售”(PFS)模型的估计显示,相对于游说献金,政府赋予社会福利的权重的估计值高得不切实际,对该权重的估计往往接近1。我们认为这是由模型估计所采用的加总层面所致:保护水平在税目层面确定,而生产数据仅在行业层面可得。利用一套新的税目层面生产数据,我们的估计表明,在142个国家的样本中,赋予社会福利的平均权重下降了77%。
Abstract
Estimates of Grossman and Helpman (1994) Protection For Sale (PFS) model yield unrealistically high estimates of the weight governments put on social welfare relative to lobbying contributions. Estimates of the former are often close to 1. We argue this is due to the level of aggregation at which the model is estimated. While protection is determined at the tariff line level, production data are only available at the industry level. Using a new production dataset at the tariff level, our estimates show that the average weight on social welfare in a sample of 142 countries declines by 77 percent.