Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists · 2026 · Ben Balmford、Brett Day、Ian Julian Bateman、Greg T. Smith
中文摘要
我们在理论和实验室中提出并考察了一种机制, 用以在个体层面监督成本高昂的情况下, 激励污染者群体中的个体付出最优减排努力。我们提出的机制是一种混合机制: 一方面因群体层面目标的实现而奖励代理人, 另一方面允许个体通过选择购买个体层面监督来保护自己免受协调失灵的影响。通过付出最优的个体努力, 受监督的代理人可以保证获得奖励, 而不受群体行为的影响。我们证明, 唯一的纳什均衡的特征是: 群体成员付出最优水平的个体努力, 同时不购买监督。因此, 该混合机制在不实际发生监督成本的情况下抑制了搭便车行为。实验室实验证实, 与单独实施的一次性总额群体层面激励以及强制个体层面监督的工具相比, 该混合机制能够带来福利改进。此外, 该混合机制保持了与群体税相当的效率水平, 同时具有更为理想的均衡外性质。
Abstract
We propose and explore, both in theory and the laboratory, a mechanism to incentivize optimal individual abatement effort in groups of polluters when individual-level monitoring is costly. The mechanism we propose is a hybrid; rewarding agents for the achievement of a group-level target, while allowing individuals to protect themselves against coordination failure by electing to purchase individual-level monitoring. By exerting optimal individual effort, a monitored agent can guarantee their reward irrespective of group behavior. We show that the unique Nash equilibrium is characterized by group members exerting optimal levels of individual effort while not purchasing monitoring. Thus, the hybrid mechanism disincentivizes free riding without realizing monitoring costs. Laboratory experiments confirm that the hybrid mechanism offers welfare gains compared to stand-alone lump-sum group-level incentives and instruments mandating individual-level monitoring. Moreover, the hybrid mechanism maintains levels of efficiency comparable to a group tax but with more desirable out-of-equilibrium properties.