中文摘要
我们考察一个需要在两名候选人之间做出抉择的投票者群体。我们提出了一族新颖的中性且防策略操纵的规则,并将其称为序贯一致同意规则。通过证明这些规则与Moulin (1983) 的M-获胜联盟规则在形式上等价,我们表明序贯一致同意规则可由中性与防策略操纵性加以刻画。我们通过构建相应算法——可将给定的M-获胜联盟规则转换为等价的序贯一致同意规则,反之亦然——来确立上述结果。该分析还可扩展至投票者可能在候选人之间持无差异态度的完整偏好域。
Abstract
We consider a group of voters that needs to decide between two candidates. We propose a novel family of neutral and strategy-proof rules, which we call sequential unanimity rules. By demonstrating their formal equivalence to the M-winning coalition rules of Moulin (1983), we show that sequential unanimity rules are characterized by neutrality and strategy-proofness. We establish our results by developing algorithms that transform a given M-winning coalition rule into an equivalent sequential unanimity rule and vice versa. The analysis can be extended to accommodate the full preference domain in which voters may be indifferent between candidates.