Games and Economic Behavior · 2026 · Hyukjun Kwon、Ran I. Shorrer
中文摘要
我们研究具有公共禀赋与私人禀赋的基于优先权的匹配市场。我们证明,效率调整延迟接受机制 (EADA) 在有效机制类中是正当嫉妒最小的,而首位交易循环机制 (TTC) 及其他常用机制则不然。我们的发现凸显了 EADA 作为移植器官市场背景下 TTC 的一种有趣替代方案。将注意力限于防策略操纵的机制时,我们证明 TTC 是正当嫉妒最小的,这强化了 Abdulkadiroglu 等人 (2020) 的结果。
Abstract
We study priority-based matching markets with public and private endowments. We show that efficiency-adjusted deferred acceptance (EADA) is justified-envy minimal in the class of efficient mechanisms, while Top trading cycles (TTC) and other popular mechanisms are not. Our findings highlight EADA as an interesting alternative to TTC in the context of transplantation-organ markets. Restricting attention to strategyproof mechanisms, we show that TTC is justified-envy minimal, strengthening the result of Abdulkadiroglu et al. (2020).