中文摘要
本文记录了一个新的典型化事实:近年来CEO薪酬水平的截面差异急剧下降。我们对这一下降提出一种解释,即企业越来越多地以规模最接近的行业同业为基准来确定CEO薪酬,从而形成薪酬集群。我们的实证检验为这一解释提供了支持,并提示行业规模基准化的兴起由三个制度因素驱动:薪酬同业群体的强制披露、代理咨询机构的影响力以及薪酬表决（say-on-pay）监管。我们的发现凸显了在薪酬决定过程中采用"一刀切"标准所带来的一种后果。
Abstract
This paper documents a new stylized fact: the cross‐sectional variation in CEO pay levels has declined precipitously in recent years. We offer one explanation for this decline, namely, firms are increasingly benchmarking CEO compensation to industry peers closest in size, thereby creating pay clusters. Our empirical tests provide support for this explanation and suggest that the rise of industry‐size benchmarking is driven by three institutional factors: the mandatory disclosure of compensation peer groups, proxy advisory influence, and say‐on‐pay regulation. Our findings highlight a consequence of adopting a one‐size‐fits‐all standard in the pay‐setting process.