The Journal of Finance · 2026 · Lily H. Fang、Jim Goldman、Alexandra Roulet
中文摘要
利用二十年的法国行政数据,我们发现,杠杆收购 (LBO) 之后,相对于控制组企业,目标企业缩小了企业内部工资差距,同时提高了盈利能力。工资差距的缩小由员工更替所驱动。在目标企业和控制组企业中均是如此:员工更替对工资分布顶部平均工资的降低幅度大于底部,原因在于离职员工的工资高于相似的员工,而新入职员工的工资低于相似的员工,在技能型员工中尤其如此。杠杆收购通过提高管理层的更替率放大了这一效应。收购之后,p90/p10、性别、年龄以及管理层/非管理层工资差距分别下降 3%、9%、21% 和 4%,且员工队伍更加年轻化。
Abstract
Using two decades of French administrative data, we find that post‐leveraged buyout (LBO), target firms reduce within‐firm pay gaps while increasing profitability relative to control firms. Employee turnover drives the pay‐gap reduction. In target and control firms alike, turnovers reduce average pay more at the top of the wage distribution than at the bottom because separated employees are paid more—new joiners less—than similar employees, especially among skilled employees. LBOs amplify this effect through increased turnover among managers. Post‐buyout, p90/p10, gender, age, and managers/non‐managers pay gaps decline by 3%, 9%, 21%, and 4% and the employee pool becomes younger.