中文摘要
本文在包含私人资本积累与长期债务的主权违约模型中研究财政规则。采用财政规则能够强化公共财政,并通过缓解两种扭曲——债务稀释与投资不足——提高长期收入。然而在短期内,经济体会经历代价高昂的转型过程,消费与投资下降以为债务削减融资。为研究这一权衡,我们将模型校准至阿根廷,并评估三种规则:债务上限、赤字上限,以及同时包含两者的双重规则。赤字上限仅在债务水平较高时实施才更可取,因为它具有更平滑的债务削减路径,但在所有状态下都施加严格约束。除此之外,双重规则带来的收益最高,它在低债务水平下结合了债务上限的灵活性,在较高债务水平下结合了赤字上限的约束性。结果对资本积累的替代设定保持稳健,且在存在政治短视时更为显著。
Abstract
We study fiscal rules in a sovereign default model with private capital accumulation and long-term debt. Their adoption strengthens public finances and increases long-run income by mitigating two distortions: debt dilution and underinvestment. In the short run, however, the economy experiences a costly transition where consumption and investment drop to finance debt reduction. To study this tradeoff, we calibrate the model to Argentina and evaluate three rules: a debt limit, a deficit limit, and a dual rule combining both. The deficit limit is preferred only when implemented at high debt levels because it features smoother debt reduction but imposes strict discipline in all states. Otherwise, gains are highest under the dual rule that combines the flexibility of debt limits at low levels with the discipline of deficit limits at higher levels. Results are robust to alternative formulations for capital accumulation and stronger in the presence of political myopia.