The Journal of Finance · 2026 · Diego Battistón、Jordi Blanes i Vidal、Rafael Hortalà-Vallvé、Dong Lou
中文摘要
我们利用来自一家投资公司的细颗粒度数据和可靠的识别策略,估计金融顾问激励对客户投资的影响。借助2018年《金融工具市场指令II》(MiFID II)实施所引发的天然实验,我们发现客户投资对顾问激励的变化反应强烈。顾问通过多种机制作出反应:(i) 促使现有客户投入新资金,(ii) 将其引导至高激励基金,(iii) 吸引更多新客户。我们还发现,MiFID II 改革产生了更加均衡的激励,这通过更低的平均费用和更强的投资组合分散化,转化为更高的投资组合效率。
Abstract
ABSTRACT We use granular data from an investment firm and a credible identification strategy to estimate the effect of financial advisors' incentives on client investments. Exploiting a natural experiment triggered by the 2018 implementation of Markets in Financial Instruments Directive II (MiFID II), we find that clients' investments respond strongly to changes in advisor incentives. Advisors react through multiple mechanisms: (i) inducing existing clients to bring in new money, (ii) channeling it to high‐incentive funds, and (iii) attracting more new clients. We also find that the MiFID II reform generated more balanced incentives, which translated into higher portfolio efficiency through lower average fees and stronger portfolio diversification.