The Journal of Finance · 2026 · Doruk Cetemen、Gonzalo Cisternas、Aaron M. Kolb、S. VISWANATHAN
中文摘要
我们提出一个关于大股东之间协调与影响的理论。拥有私人信息的积极投资者按顺序择时交易以降低收购成本，从而促使对订单流的策略性运用：领导者型积极投资者为其追随者创造交易收益，最终影响后者承担更大的价值增进型干预成本的意愿。通过这一渠道，知情交易可以表现出可预测性，这与 Kyle（1985, Econometrica 53, 1315–1335）形成鲜明对比。我们解释了这种新颖的可预测性如何塑造影响治理的搭便车问题，以及它如何产生与实证文献所记录的类似的价格异常。我们还揭示了私人信息相互依赖如何成为所研究机制的关键催化剂。
Abstract
ABSTRACT We propose a theory of coordination and influence among blockholders. Privately informed activists time their trades in sequence to lower acquisition costs, prompting a strategic use of order flows: leader activists create trading gains for their followers, ultimately influencing their willingness to bear greater value‐enhancing intervention costs. Through this channel, informed trades can exhibit predictability, in sharp contrast with Kyle (1985, Econometrica 53, 1315–1335). We explain how this novel predictability shapes free‐rider problems affecting governance, and how it produces price abnormalities analogous to those documented empirically. We also uncover how private information interdependence can be a key catalyst for the mechanism studied.