The Journal of Finance · 2026 · John D. Kepler、CHARLES G. MCCLURE、Christopher R. Stewart
中文摘要
反垄断法要求对超过资产规模门槛的并购(M&A)进行审查,而该门槛基于的会计准则将大部分无形资本排除在外。我们表明,这一排除导致数千起无形资产密集型并购无需申报。无需申报交易中的收购方获得了更高的股权价值和价格加成,尤其是在整合产品市场时。此外,无需申报的制药类交易涉及重叠药品项目的可能性是其他交易的三倍,而这些重叠项目随后被终止的可能性高出40%。我们的结果表明,无形资产的增长可能通过对消费者最为关注的行业进行无需申报的整合,从而加剧市场势力。
Abstract
ABSTRACT Antitrust laws mandate review of mergers and acquisitions (M&As) that exceed an asset size threshold based on accounting standards that exclude most intangible capital. We show that this exclusion leads to thousands of intangible‐intensive M&As being nonreportable. Acquirers in nonreportable deals achieve higher equity values and price markups, especially when consolidating product markets. Furthermore, nonreportable pharmaceutical deals are three times more likely to involve overlapping drug projects, which are subsequently 40% more likely to be terminated. Our results suggest that the growth of intangible assets may exacerbate market power through nonreportable consolidation of the sectors most concerning for consumers.