Games and Economic Behavior · 2026 · Mikel Álvarez-Mozos、Inés Macho‐Stadler、David Pérez‐Castrillo
中文摘要
我们引入了具有跨期外部性的博弈族，其中两个不相交的参与者集合依次行动。由当前一批参与者组成的联盟创造当期价值。此外，当前的参与者划分对将来产生外部性；由未来参与者组成的联盟的价值受到这一外部性的影响。我们调整了经典的沙普利公理，并研究了它们在我们这一类博弈中的含义。这些公理不足以确定唯一解。我们借助将沙普利值解释为参与者对联盟的预期贡献，引入了两个值：单联盟外部性值与朴素值。我们陈述了这两个值与一个相关联的特征函数形式博弈的沙普利值之间的关系。我们的主要结果通过在经典沙普利公理之上各增加一个额外性质来刻画这两个值。贡献平等待遇性质导出了对单联盟外部性值的刻画。外部性平等待遇性质则刻画了朴素值。
Abstract
We introduce the family of games with intertemporal externalities, where two disjoint sets of players play sequentially. Coalitions formed by the present cohort generate worth today. Moreover, today’s partition of players exerts an externality on the future; the worth of a coalition formed by future players is influenced by this externality. We adapt the classic Shapley axioms and study their implications in our class of games. They do not suffice to single out a unique solution. We introduce two values using the interpretation of the Shapley value as the players’ expected contributions to coalitions: the one-coalition externality value and the naive value. We state a relationship between these values and the Shapley value of an associated game in characteristic function form. Our main results characterize the two values by adding one additional property to the classic Shapley axioms. A property of equal treatment of contributions leads to characterizing the one-coalition externality value. A property of equal treatment of externalities characterizes the naive value.