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货币政策、通胀与危机:来自历史与行政数据的证据

Monetary Policy, Inflation, and Crises: Evidence from History and Administrative Data
The Journal of Finance · 2026 · Gabriel Jiménez、DMITRY KUVSHINOV、José‐Luis Peydró、Björn Richter

中文摘要

我们分析了 17 个国家 150 年的数据,表明 U 型的货币利率路径会通过信贷与资产价格周期提高银行业危机风险。加息(原始或经工具变量处理)会提高危机风险,但仅当其之前存在长期降息时才会如此。这些模式为银行业危机所独有,不同于非危机的衰退。关于机制,长期降息提高了出现大规模信贷与资产价格繁荣的可能性,这与信贷供给与风险承担上升相一致。随后的加息会大幅压低信贷与资产价格,并提高银行已实现的信用风险,而非利率风险。我们在西班牙的贷款层面行政数据中发现了与之一致的结果。

Abstract

ABSTRACT We show that a U‐shaped monetary rate path increases banking crisis risk, via credit and asset price cycles, analyzing 17 countries over 150 years. Rate hikes (raw or instrumented) increase crisis risk, but only if preceded by prolonged cuts. These patterns are unique to banking crises, unlike noncrisis recessions. Regarding the mechanism, prolonged cuts raise the likelihood of large credit and asset price booms, consistent with higher credit supply and risk‐taking. Subsequent hikes strongly reduce credit and asset prices, and increase banks' realized credit risk, rather than interest rate risk. We find consistent results in administrative loan‐level data for Spain.
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