Optimal Queue Design
我们研究当代理人具有同质偏好、且必须被激励以进入并留在队列中时,通过队列实现的最优服务配置。设计者控制进入、退出、服务优先级以及关于队列优先级的信息。在一个温和的正则性条件下,最优机制仅在队列长度不超过某一截止值时才接纳代理人,从不移除已接纳的代理人,按先到先服务(FCFS)规则为其提供服务,并且除建议外不提供任何其他信息。在相当广泛的一类环境中,FCFS 对最优性同样是必要的。这一结果识别出排队规则在调控代理人信念与动态激励方面的一个新作用,并揭示了 FCFS 在这方面迄今未被认识到的一种优点。
英文原文
We study optimal service allocation through queues when agents have homogeneous preferences and must be incentivized to enter and remain in the queue. The designer controls entry, exit, service priority, and information about queue priorities. Under a mild regularity condition, the optimal mechanism admits agents only up to a cutoff queue length, never removes admitted agents, serves them according to a first-come, first-served (FCFS) rule, and provides no information beyond recommendations. FCFS is also necessary for optimality in a rich domain. The result identifies a new role for queue disciplines in regulating agents’ beliefs and dynamic incentives, and uncovers a hitherto unrecognized virtue of FCFS in this regard.