The Value of Information in a Congested Fishery
我们构建了一个可能存在拥挤效应的渔业模型，其中企业获得关于最密集鱼群位置的公共信号与私人信号。我们以解析方式确定了参数空间中公共信息和（或）私人信息精度提高会增进福利的区域，并考察了两种类型信息共享的效应。我们利用来自世界最大渔业的高分辨率数据估计了该结构模型。点估计表明，更精确的私人信息会提高福利，而更精确的公共信息对福利的影响微乎其微。此外，福利对私人信息精度变化的敏感程度远高于对公共信息精度变化的敏感程度。这一差异反映了公共信息比私人信息更能加剧拥挤这一事实。我们还从经验上发现，少量信息共享可能降低福利，而更大范围的信息共享则会提高福利，信息俱乐部亦然。
英文原文
Abstract We model a fishery with potential congestion, in which firms obtain public and private signals about the location of the densest fish stock. We analytically determine the regions of parameter space where greater precision of public and/or private information increases welfare, and we examine the effects of two types of information sharing. Using high-resolution data from the world’s largest fishery, we estimate the structural model. Point estimates imply that more precise private information raises welfare, whereas more precise public information has a negligible effect on welfare. Moreover, welfare is much more sensitive to changes in the precision of private information than to changes in the precision of public information. This difference reflects the fact that public information increases congestion more than private information does. We also find empirically that a small amount of information sharing can reduce welfare, whereas more extensive information sharing raises welfare, as do information clubs.