A mechanism for the efficient provision of Potential Pareto public goods
提供一种会给所在社区带来局部损害的公共品会引发两个此前未被同时探讨的问题：设施选址何处，以及设施规模应为多大。我们提出一种机制，它将某些类似市场的属性与经过修正的第二价格拍卖相结合。该机制选定承载社区、设施规模、对承载项目的补偿，并确定补偿如何在非承载社区之间分配。若每个社区都如实竞标以成为承载社区——没有任何社区有动机偏离这一策略——则所选定的配置是全局最优的，即便各社区的偏好属于私人信息。与既有文献不同，承载社区支付次高报价，同时获得市场收益，以防止最优规模出现扭曲。
英文原文
Providing a public good that causes a local harm to its host poses two problems previously unexplored together: where to locate it and how large it should be. We propose a mechanism combining some market-like properties with a modified second-price auction. The mechanism selects a host, a facility size, a compensation for hosting the project, and determines how the compensation is split among the non-hosts. If each community bids truthfully for becoming the host–a strategy from which no community has incentives to deviate–the selected allocation is globally optimal, even if communities’ preferences are private information. In contrast with the literature, the host pays the second-highest bid while receiving the market benefits to prevent distortions in the optimal size.