理论论文

We study the welfare effects of price discrimination in a duopoly with both captive and contested consumers. Using a unified information design approach, we characterize the best and worst market segmentations for producer surplus, consumer surplus, and social surplus. The firm-optimal segmentation, which divides the market into two nested segments, consistently reduces consumer welfare relative to uniform pricing. The consumer-optimal segmentation, which divides the market into a symmetric segment and a nested segment, may sometimes yield a Pareto improvement but does not necessarily coincide with the social-optimal segmentation. (JEL D43, D83)

We analyze oligopolistic competition in which firms use contracts contingent on what buyers purchase from their rivals. We present a new mechanism through which a dominant firm, by using these contracts, can gain more from exploiting its rivals than from foreclosing them. This exploitation is achieved by requiring buyers to source at least a certain share of their total requirements from the dominant firm, though less than 100 percent. By optimally designing these contracts, the dominant firm can earn as much as it would if it were to acquire the rivals' specific technological and marketing capabilities at no cost. (JEL D43, D82, D86, K21, L14, M31)

We prove a Folk theorem when players with bounded rationality learn as they play a repeated potential game. We use a dynamic generalization of smooth fictitious play with bounded $m$-memory strategies to model learning with bounded rationality that is consistent with learning by algorithms. In a repeated potential game with perfect monitoring, we use this learning model to show that for any feasible and individually rational payoff profile, if players have sufficient memory, are sufficiently patient, and best respond with sufficiently few mistakes, then the players have a non-zero probability of learning an $m$-memory strategy profile that achieves an average payoff close to the specified payoff profile for an appropriate continuation game. Moreover, the strategy profile learned is an $m$-memory $\epsilon$-subgame perfect equilibrium of the repeated game. This finding demonstrates that competition authorities are correct in their concern about algorithmic collusion.

Using agile supply chains, fast fashion companies have been viewed as best practice examples in industries. Prior research focuses on how agility can equip such companies with strong sense-and-respond capabilities to identify and fulfill unpredictable customer demands. There is another powerful dimension of agility—the ability to create new products frequently—that has enabled recent market success of companies such as Shein and Temu, labeled by some industry press as ultra-fast fashion. These companies, relying on end-to-end digital technologies, have pushed this dimension of agility to unprecedentedly high levels, launching new products with great frequency and variety. The frequent product launches create freshness, stimulating latent demands of consumers and making these companies “ultra-fresh” fashion, a term we adopt in this paper. We seek to model this dimension of agility as an operational strategy for demand creation. Our model enables us to explore the effects through the lens of profit to the firm, consumer surplus, and environmental impact. Our analysis reveals that frequent product launches, high variety, and low prices—the three salient features of ultra-fresh fashion—are driven by both the product design agility and the customers’ interest for product freshness. The ultra-fresh strategy allows steady profit increase for the firm and benefits consumers in aggregate but may cause negative environmental impact if left unchecked. This paper was accepted by Jay Swaminathan, operations management. Supplemental Material: The online appendix and data files are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2024.06249 .

本文构建了一个包含数字企业的多产品异质性企业模型，从柔性生产视角深入探索了数字企业赋能多产品企业出口产品策略优化的理论机制。我们采用2000-2016年中国微观企业层面的数据，构建模型检验了数字接近度对中国制造业企业出口产品策略的影响及其机制。研究结果表明：中国制造业企业与数字企业间接近度的提升不仅扩张了其出口产品范围，还显著提升了其出口偏度，在改善企业内资源配置的同时丰富了其出口产品范围，实现了中国企业出口产品策略在效率与多样性上的共同提升。此外，机制分析结果表明，数字接近度的柔性生产效应不仅直接提升了制造业企业的柔性生产能力，还间接提高了市场竞争程度，最终驱动制造业企业出口产品策略的优化。

We develop an aggregative games approach to study oligopolistic price competition with multiproduct firms. We introduce a new class of IIA demand systems, derived from discrete/continuous choice, and nesting CES and logit demands. The associated pricing game with multiproduct firms is aggregative and a firm's optimal price vector can be summarized by a uni-dimensional sufficient statistic, the ι-markup. We prove existence of equilibrium using a nested fixed-point argument, and provide conditions for equilibrium uniqueness. In equilibrium, firms may choose not to offer some products. We analyze the pricing distortions and provide monotone comparative statics. Under (nested) CES and logit demands, another aggregation property obtains: All relevant information for determining a firm's performance and competitive impact is contained in that firm's uni-dimensional type. We extend the model to nonlinear pricing, quantity competition, general equilibrium, and demand systems with a nest structure. Finally, we discuss applications to merger analysis and international trade.